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use#LAAINDICATOR PROPERTIES OF THE PAPER–BILL SPREAD:
LESSONS FROM RECENT EXPERIENCE
Benjamin M. Friedman and Kenneth N. Kuttner*
Abstract—A feature of U.S. postwar business cycle experience that is by
now widely documented is the tendency of the spread between the
respective interest rates on commercial paper and Treasury bills to widen
shortly before the onset of recessions. By contrast, the paper–bill spread
did not anticipate the 1990–1991 recession. Empirical work presented in
this paper supports two (not mutually exclusive) explanations for this
departure from past experience. First, at least part of the paper–bill
spread’s predictive content with respect to business cycle ﬂuctuations
stems from its role as an indicator of monetary policy, but the 1990–1991
recession was unusual in postwar U.S. experience in not being immedi-
ately precipitated by tight monetary policy. Second, movements of the
spread during the few years just prior to the 1990–1991 recession were
strongly inﬂuenced by changes in the relative quantities of commercial
paper, bank CDs, and Treasury bills that occurred for reasons unrelated to
the business cycle. This latter ﬁnding in particular sheds light on the
important role of imperfect substitutability of different short-term debt
instruments in investors’ portfolios, and highlights the burdens associated
with using relative interest rate relationships as business cycle indicators.
I. Introduction
N
UMEROUS researchers writing in recent years have
documented the information content, with respect to
subsequent ﬂuctuations in U.S. real output, of the difference
between the respective interest rates on commercial paper
and Treasury bills.1As ﬁgure 1 shows, the paper–bill spread
tends to widen markedly about 6 months before the onset of
a business recession (or other slowdown in real economic
activity). Since 1959 the spread has averaged 88 basis points
during all 6-month periods immediately prior to recessions
and 103 basis points during recessions, versus only 43 basis
points in all other months.2 Various researchers have shown
that this relationship has historically been highly signiﬁcant
in standard regression analysis (more or less regardless of
what other regressors the equation includes), in Granger-
type ‘‘causality’’tests, and in variance decompositions based
on vector autoregressions. By now familiar reasons why the
paper–bill spread would widen in anticipation of business
downturns include the possibility that a widening spread is
(1) an indicator of tight monetary policy, (2) a reﬂection of
anticipations of business bankruptcies, and (3) a result of
corporations’ growing cash requirements as the business
expansion nears its peak.
By contrast, the paper–bill spread failed completely to
anticipate the 1990–1991 recession. As ﬁgure 1 also shows,
the spread ﬂuctuated at levels normally predictive of reces-
sion from mid-1987 to mid-1989, then narrowed sufficiently
to eliminate any indication of likely recession by the
beginning of 1990, and did not noticeably begin to widen
again until after the recession had begun in July 1990. Since
then the behavior of the paper–bill spread has been more
consistent with prior patterns. The spread declined sharply
just as the recession ended in March 1991, and from then
through late 1996 (the time of writing) it remained at narrow,
clearly nonrecessionary levels.
The failure of the paper–bill spread to anticipate the
1990–1991 recession was a failure shared by essentially all
familiar monetary and ﬁnancial indicator variables. For
example, growth of the M2 money stock peaked in late 1986
and by year-end 1987 had slowed to rates that historically
would have predicted recession. Growth of M2 revived in
1988, faltered again in early 1989, but then revived even
more strongly from mid-1989 onward, so that by the time
the recession began, at midyear 1990, M2 also was giving
just the opposite signal.The slope of the yield curve, another
familiar business cycle indicator, ﬂattened in 1988 and
throughout 1989 in a way that often anticipates recessions,
but by early 1990 the yield curve began to steepen again
while the recession was still half a year away. Some
researchers have concluded, in part on the basis of this
universal failure of standard indicator variables drawn from
the ﬁnancial side of the economy, that the 1990–1991
recession was unique in its origins.3
The object of this paper is to see what conclusions can be
drawn from a closer look at the failure of the paper–bill
spread in particular during this episode. To anticipate, the
results of this analysis offer some support for the claim that
the 1990–1991 recession was highly unusual in post–World
War II U.S. experience, at least in not being immediately
precipitated by tight monetary policy. But as previous
research has shown (and results reported here reaffirm), the
predictive content of the paper–bill spread with respect to
real output apart from the 1990–1991 experience has not
been solely a matter of the spread’s role as an indicator of
monetary policy. Hence merely saying that monetary policy
was not the cause of the recession is not sufficient to explain
the aberrant movement of the paper–bill spread. To that
more speciﬁc end, the results presented here point also to
developments in both ﬁscal policy and debt management
policy, as well as in the banking system, during the late
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key role of imperfect substitutability of commercial paper
and Treasury bills in investors’portfolios, and highlights the
burdens that such imperfect substitutability places on the use
of this or any similar interest rate spread variable as a
business cycle indicator.
II. Potential Explanations for the Failure
Why might the paper–bill spread, contrary to previous
experience, have failed to anticipate the 1990–1991 business
recession?At least three different explanations are plausible,
corresponding in turn to three different hypotheses about
why the spread is normally related to ﬂuctuations of real
output in the ﬁrst place. In addition, a fourth potential
explanation, bearing on the extent to which investors regard
commercial paper and Treasury bills as portfolio substitutes,
also merits investigation.
A. Absence of Tight Monetary Policy
First, if ﬂuctuations of the paper–bill spread mostly
indicate changes in the stance of monetary policy, but tight
monetary policy did not play a signiﬁcant role in bringing
about the 1990–1991 recession, there is no reason why the
spread should have widened in advance of this decline in
output. Several researchers writing on this subject have
worked out models in which a widening paper–bill spread is
an indicator of tight monetary policy.4 In brief, the central
idea is that restricting the growth of bank reserves causes
banks to be less forthcoming in granting loans, which in turn
drives would-be borrowers to seek funds in the commercial
paper market instead. The resulting increase in commercial
paper issuance would then raise the paper rate, relative to the
Treasury bill rate, either because the marginal borrowers
driven out of the banking system are on average smaller and
less creditworthy than borrowers already active in the
commercial paper market (so that the average liquidity and
quality of outstanding paper deteriorate) or, given reason-
able restrictions on the relevant asset supply and demand
elasticities, simply because investors regard paper and bills
as imperfect portfolio substitutes (so that relative outstand-
ing quantitites affect relative required returns).5
Although the subject remains one of contention, many
economists have documented the key role of tight monetary
policy—however deﬁned and measured—in bringing about
most if not all U.S. business downturns.6 To the extent that
that is so, and that tight monetary policy also widens the
paper–bill spread, movements in the spread would naturally
contain systematic information about subsequent move-
ments in real output. But in the case of a decline in output
that occurred independently of tight money—for example,
because of an adverse supply shock, or tight ﬁscal policy, or
a fall in consumer conﬁdence—no such relationship would
appear.
B. Inaccurate Market Perceptions of Default Risk
Asecond potential source of the usual predictive power of
the paper–bill spread with respect to real output is the
spread’s role as an indicator of market perceptions of the
likelihood of business bankruptcy and default. Unlike the
U.S.Treasury, private ﬁrms can and sometimes do default on
their debts, and commercial paper is by deﬁnition an
unsecured obligation. Moreover, the incidence of corporate
bankruptcy and default ﬂuctuates in a pronounced way with
the business cycle. If investors in commercial paper perceive
speciﬁc signs of default risk at individual companies, or if
they simply believe on other grounds that a business
downturn is imminent and hence infer that the probability of
default by any given company is greater, they will therefore
demand a higher stated interest rate on paper relative to
default-free bills.
To the extent that investors’expectations in either of these
regards have at least some systematic tendency to be correct,
the paper–bill spread will therefore widen in advance of
business downturns. (Further, to the extent that investors
base their expectations on assessments of individual ﬁrms’
prospects, the spread serves as a summary statistic for
disparate sources of information that may be difficult to
capture compactly in standard business indicators.) Tending
to be correct on average is not the same as being correct all
the time, however. Expectations of recession and consequent
default risk that fail to materialize will widen the paper–bill
4 See, for example, Bernanke (1990), Kuttner (1992), Friedman and
Kuttner (1993a), Kashyap et al. (1993), and Calomiris et al. (1994).
5 Friedman and Kuttner (1993b) also offered a third potential reason for
tight monetary policy to widen the spread, based on the difference in how
‘‘relationship’’ markets such as the bank loan market and ‘‘arm’s length’’
markets such as the commercial paper market allocate the noninterest costs
of borrowing.
6 The classic historical reference is Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Prominent examples of the more recent literature include Romer and
Romer (1989) and Bernanke and Blinder (1992). For an opposing point of
view see, for example, Prescott (1986).
FIGURE 1.—SIX-MONTH PAPER–BILL SPREAD,J ANUARY 1959
TO SEPTEMBER 1996 (RECESSIONS SHADED)
35 INDICATOR PROPERTIES OF PAPER–BILL SPREADspread even though no business downturn occurs subse-
quently. Conversely, conﬁdence in the business outlook will
keep the spread narrow even if that conﬁdence subsequently
proves mistaken. Indeed, if changing perceptions of default
risk were the only reason why variation in the spread on
average contains information about future output ﬂuctua-
tions, the failure of the spread to widen before the 1990–
1991 recession would simply mean that investors failed to
see the downturn coming.
C. Changes in Asset Quantities Unrelated
to the Business Cycle
Third, to the extent that commercial paper and Treasury
bills are imperfect substitutes in investors’portfolios, so that
changes in the relative outstanding supplies of these two
instruments bring about changes in their relative expected
returns, those relative interest rate movements will be
connected to business cycle ﬂuctuations only if the underly-
ing movements in the relative quantities are themselves a
consequence of business cycle developments. Investors in
U.S. markets plausibly treat commercial paper and Treasury
bills as imperfect substitutes for several reasons, including
differing state-level income tax treatment of interest earned
(interest from bills is exempt), different liquidity (much
greater for bills), and different default risk (zero for bills).7
All other things being equal, therefore, when factors related
to the business cycle move the quantity of commercial paper
relative to that of Treasury bills—for example, when tight
monetary policy drives borrowers out of the banking system,
or when slowing sales require ﬁrms to raise more cash to
ﬁnance their inventories—the resulting movements in the
paper–bill spread bear a systematic relationship to move-
ments in real output.
By contrast, factors unrelated to the business cycle can
also cause the relative quantities of commercial paper and
Treasury bills to vary, and these changes too imply move-
ments in relative interest rates. For example, the Treasury’s
debt management policy determines its reliance on bills (that
is, discounted obligations maturing in one year or less)
versus longer term coupon-bearing securities in ﬁnancing a
given U.S. Government deﬁcit. State and local governments
buy Treasury securities to ‘‘prerefund’’ their own outstand-
ing obligations, thereby reducing the market supply avail-
able to private investors. Foreign central banks that inter-
vene to support the dollar exchange rate are free in principle
to hold the dollars they acquire in any form they choose, but
in practice the proceeds of such intervention go almost
entirely into Treasury bills, again reducing the market
supply available to private investors. The repeated ﬁnding
that the paper–bill spread bears a highly signiﬁcant relation-
ship to business cycle ﬂuctuations presumably means that
‘‘noise’’ in the spread due to such idiosyncratic movements
in relative asset quantitites is mostly small compared to
movements that are systematically connected to the business
cycle. But it is also possible that sufficiently large idiosyn-
cratic movements may dominate the movement of the spread
over any given period, and they may have done so in the
episode in question here.
D. Increasing Substitutability
Finally, it is also possible that the evolution of the U.S.
ﬁnancial markets over time has rendered commercial paper
andTreasury bills more nearly perfect substitutes, perhaps to
the point that the spread between these two instruments’
respective returns no longer bears a systematic relationship
to variations in their respective quantities (or, for that matter,
to anything else connected to the business cycle).8 For
example, the more the markets are dominated by tax-exempt
institutional investors, the less important is the differential
tax treatment of paper and bills. As the commercial paper
market has grown over the years ($675 billion outstanding
as of year-end 1995), the liquidity of the typical issue may
have improved. And with but few actual defaults, at least
among prime-rated issuers, investors’ perception of the
default risk on commercial paper may have diminished.
(Further, most issuers today back up their outstanding
commercial paper with lines of credit at banks, although
these arrangements do not provide full default protection
because the bank agreements typically include a ‘‘no
material changes’’clause.)
One immediate implication of closer substitutability be-
tween commercial paper and Treasury bills would be a
narrower average spread between their two respective
interest rates. As ﬁgure 1 immediately shows, there is no
evidence that such systematic narrowing occurred in the
period leading up to the 1990–1991 recession. (To the
contrary, one part of the puzzle to be explained is that the
spread was so wide from mid-1987 to mid-1989.) A further
implication, however, is that the spread between returns on
two assets that are increasingly close substitutes would
exhibit ﬂuctuations that were increasingly just random
noise, rather than reﬂections of the business cycle or other
systematic inﬂuences. In particular, changing relative asset
supplies would have a smaller, if not zero, effect on the
spread. This second implication of the increasingly perfect
substitutability hypothesis bears empirical investigation.
III. ASystematic Look at the Recent Experience
The solid lines in the four panels of ﬁgure 2 display the
monthly movements of the paper–bill spread together with
three ﬁnancial variables intended to capture the three main
7 Cook (1981) was among the ﬁrst to emphasize the imperfect substitut-
ability of commercial paper and Treasury bills.
8 Kashyap et al. (1993) and Thoma and Gray (1994) have argued along
these lines.
36 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSfactors to which researchers have pointed in efforts to
account for the usual systematic relationship between the
spread and real output. The paper–bill spread itself is in the
top panel. The federal funds rate, used as an indicator of
monetary policy, is in the second panel.9 Next is the interest
rate differential between commercial paper issues rated P2
(the second highest category) and P1 (the highest) by
Moody’s Investors Service, used as a measure of perceived
default risk. The bottom panel shows the ratio of the volume
of outstanding commercial paper plus bank (and thrift)
certiﬁcates of deposit to this sum plus the volume of
outstanding Treasury bills, used to measure relative asset
quantities. Each panel displays monthly data beginning in
1985, a date comfortably in advance of the puzzling episode
under investigation here.
The inclusion of bank CDs in both numerator and
denominator of the asset quantity ratio reﬂects the assump-
tion that investors treat CDs and commercial paper as
(essentially) perfect substitutes for one another, and neither
as a perfect substitute for Treasury bills, in their portfo-
lios—an assumption that is plausible on both a priori and
empirical grounds. Bank CDs are comparable to commercial
paper, and correspondingly different from Treasury bills, in
tax treatment, default risk, and liquidity. Not only is the
average CD–paper spread much smaller than the average
paper–bill spread (13 basis points versus 64), but the
correlation between the CD–bill spread and the paper–bill
spread is 0.97 (versus 0.78 between the CD–bill spread and
the CD–paper spread, and only 0.60 between the CD–paper
spread and the paper–bill spread).10 In addition, the CD–bill
spread, like the paper–bill spread, is highly signiﬁcant in
standard equations for real output (even in the presence of
the federal funds rate), while the CD–paper spread is not.11
Did the movements of the paper–bill spread in the period
leading up to and including the 1990–1991 recession mostly
reﬂect movements in the federal funds rate, in perceived
default risk, or in relative asset quantities? Or were the
spread’s movements during this period mostly unrelated to
these three ﬁnancial variables (and the channels of economic
inﬂuence that they represent)?
The dashed lines in the four panels of ﬁgure 2 begin to
address this question by plotting the respective movement of
the spread and each of these other variables that is attributed
to the variable’s ‘‘own’’innovations in a six-variable vector
autoregression including growth of industrial production,
growth of the producer price index, the other three ﬁnancial
variables as shown, and the paper–bill spread itself, orthogo-
nalized in that order.12 Following previous researchers, this
ordering implies that the central bank may take account of
current-month movements of output and prices in setting
monetary policy (the federal funds rate), but that monetary
policy does not affect either output or prices within the
month.13 It also implies that monetary policy may affect any
or all of the other three ﬁnancial variables within the month,
but not vice versa. Finally, ordering the paper–bill spread
last means that the spread may respond within the month to
any of the other real- or ﬁnancial-sector variables, but not
vice versa. The vector autoregression is estimated using
9 Bernanke (1990), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and others have used
the federal funds rate as a monetary policy indicator.
10 Values are based on monthly data for January 1975 through September
1996 for the 3-month paper, bill, and CD rates. (No 6-month CD rates are
available.) Especially for recent years, it would also be plausible to include
U.S. holdings of Eurodollar CDs and Eurodollar commercial paper as
another close substitute for U.S. commercial paper. Outstanding amounts
of Euro CDs and Euro paper are still small, however, compared to U.S.
bills, paper, and CDs.
11 The treatment of commercial paper and bank (and thrift) CDs as
perfect substitutes follows Friedman and Kuttner (1993b); see there for
further supporting evidence.
12 The industrial production and PPI series both enter the autoregression
in log-differenced form; the four ﬁnancial variables enter as levels. The
industrial production data are seasonally adjusted; data for all other
variables are not.
13 See, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al.
(1996).
FIGURE 2.—KEY FINANCIAL VARIABLES AND THEIR INNOVATIONS
The solid lines show the actual movements of the ﬁnancial variables included in the VAR described in
the text.The dashed lines show the contributions of each series’‘‘own’’innovations derived from the same
VAR.
37 INDICATOR PROPERTIES OF PAPER–BILL SPREADmonthly data for January 1976 to September 1996, with six
lags on each variable.14,15
Several relevant conclusions emerge from this compari-
son of actual ﬂuctuations to the corresponding innovations.
First, part of the anomalous movement in the paper–bill
spread during 1987–1990—but importantly, for purposes of
this paper’s analysis, only part—is left as unexplained in the
sense of being attributed to the spread’s ‘‘own’’innovations.
From the low point in September 1986 to the high point in
October 1987 (the month of the stock market crash), the
spread widened by 101 basis points. The corresponding
movement contributed by the spread’s ‘‘own’’ innovations
was just 46 basis points, with most of that occurring in the
month of the crash, and by January 1988 the ‘‘own’’
component was already back to where it had been in
September 1986. The spread narrowed by 79 basis points
between April 1989 and February 1990, and in this case the
corresponding movement in the ‘‘own’’ component was
(minus) 55 basis points. In other words, part, but only a part,
of the movement in the spread during this period that ran so
counter to prior business cycle experience was unexplain-
able noise. The rest can be attributed to systematic inﬂu-
ences, including the three other ﬁnancial variables repre-
sented in this system.
Which ones? Not monetary policy, at least not according
to this analysis. As the second panel of ﬁgure 2 shows, the
(nominal) federal funds rate was low in 1987 when the
spread was puzzlingly wide, and the funds rate was higher in
1989 when the spread was narrowing. The corresponding
innovations in the federal funds rate tell qualitatively the
same story, but here the main message is that quantitatively
monetary policy was simply not very active. In contrast to
the usual ﬁnding that the historically high levels of the funds
rate during the 1979–1981 episodes of tight money under
Paul Volcker corresponded to large positive funds rate
innovations, here the ‘‘own’’ component of the funds rate
changed little during the several years leading up to July
1990, and what change took place was mostly downward.
This perspective on the more recent experience provides
support for the familiar claim that the 1990–1991 recession
was unusual in not being proximately due to unusually tight
monetary policy.16
How about the other two ﬁnancial indicators?17 Changes
in perceived default risk also appear to have played only a
limited role during the period leading up to the 1990–1991
recession. Apart from a small but regular spike each
December, presumably reﬂecting ‘‘window dressing’’ sales
by institutions eager to show only top-rated paper on their
year-end balance sheets, the P2–P1 quality differential
followed a smooth, slightly downward trend from the
middle 1980s until just a few months before the recession
began. (The larger window dressing effect in 1990, 1991,
and 1992 probably reﬂects the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s action limiting money market funds’holdings
of commercial paper with less than a P1 rating.) The
component of the quality differential attributable to that
variable’s ‘‘own’’ innovations showed somewhat closer
correspondence with movements in the paper–bill spread—
especially the narrowing in mid-1987 and again in early
1989—but even here the correspondence is hardly close.
By contrast, the ratio of commercial paper plus CDs to the
broader sum also including Treasury bills ﬂuctuated widely
during this period, and especially during 1987–1990 much
of that ﬂuctuation was attributable to this ratio’s ‘‘own’’
innovations rather than to the other variables included in this
analysis. The sustained increase in the quantity ratio during
1986–1989 (a period when many U.S. businesses were
greatly increasing their debt loads through leveraged buy-
outs, stock repurchases, and debt-ﬁnanced acquisitions) was
in large part the cumulated effect of positive ‘‘own’’
innovations, while a substantial part of the even more rapid
decline of the quantity ratio during 1990–1993 (the era of
widespread ‘‘deleveraging’’) was the cumulative effect of
negative ‘‘own’’innovations.
At least qualitatively, the bulge in the quantity ratio during
1987–1988 would have caused the paper–bill interest rate
spread to widen, and the decline in the quantity ratio from
mid-1989 on would have caused the paper–bill spread to
narrow. Moreover, to the extent that these movements in the
quantity ratio were the effect of this variable’s ‘‘own’’
innovations, not explained by the other variables in the
system—importantly including real output and prices, as
well as the level of interest rates—the resulting quantity-
driven inﬂuences on the spread would have been unrelated
to the business cycle. In particular, in this case the increase
in the quantity ratio during 1986–1989 was therefore not
primarily a reﬂection of tight monetary policy driving
borrowers from the banks into the commercial paper market,
or of the usual business cycle effects on corporate cash
requirements, nor was the decline in the quantity ratio after
mid-1989 due to such usual cyclical factors either.
14 The earliest possible sample starting date would be January 1974, the
beginning of the data series for the Moody’s P2–P1 quality differential.
The reason for starting in January 1976 instead is to eliminate any
suggestion that the estimated relation between real output and the
paper–bill spread is a spurious result due to the sharp spike in the spread in
1974 (see again ﬁgure 1). Thoma and Gray (1994), for example, have
argued along those lines, but in fact results showing that the paper–bill
spread has predictive content with respect to real output are highly robust
to eliminating the 1974 spike period.
15 Results based on an alternative system with six lags on some variables
and twelve on others, determined according to a series of goodness-of-ﬁt
criteria, were virtually indistinguishable from those reported here.
16 As is well known, the use of vector autoregression innovations—for
interest rates, monetary aggregates, or any other variable—as an indicator
of monetary policy necessarily excludes any systematic (for example,
countercyclical) component of policy; see, for example, the discussion in
Sims (1992), Poole (1994), and Friedman (1996). For this reason it is
important to examine both the innovations and the movements of the funds
rate itself, as is done here.
17 The suggestion that the paper–bill spread is exclusively a monetary
policy indicator, as Bernanke (1990) and Kashyap et al. (1993) have
proposed, is not supported by the data. For example, in the six-variable
vector autoregression under study here, the federal funds rate together with
output growth and inﬂation—and with these variables ordered ﬁrst—
accounts for only 49% of the variance of the spread at a 6-month horizon.
38 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSFigure 3 shows that these three sets of qualitative
conclusions carry over to quantitative analysis. In each panel
the solid line is the actual movement of the paper–bill spread
during January 1985 to September 1996, and the dashed line
is a corresponding baseline forecast generated by simulating
forward the six-variable vector autoregression using data
through the end of 1984 only. (These two lines are identical
across all three panels in the ﬁgure.) The dotted line in each
panel then shows the contribution to the paper–bill spread,
measured around that baseline, of the estimated innovations
corresponding to each in turn among the three other ﬁnancial
variables under study here.
Not surprisingly, given the results shown in ﬁgure 2,
federal funds rate innovations played little if any role in
accounting for the movement of the paper–bill spread during
1987–1990. Unlike in the Volcker period, for which an
analogous exercise indicates not only large federal funds
rate innovations but large effects of those innovations on the
spread, in this most recent episode monetary policy seems
not to have been much of a factor. Default risk innovations
likewise played little part.
By contrast, the bottom panel of ﬁgure 3 shows that much
of the widening of the paper–bill spread during 1987–1988
and the narrowing in 1989 and early 1990 is attributable to
asset quantity innovations. Indeed, for the period of January
1987 through June 1990 (the last month before the recession
began) the simple correlation between the actual spread and
the value calculated as the baseline plus the effect of quantity
ratio innovations is 0.74. The cumulative contribution to the
spread due to quantity ratio innovations rose rapidly from
just 6 basis points in January 1987 to 21 basis points in July,
ﬂuctuated around that level throughout the next two years
(the peak effect was 26 basis points in July 1988), and then
declined abruptly back to 5 basis points in October 1989 and
on to 225 basis points in January 1991. Moreover, the large
and sustained positive inﬂuence on the spread due to
quantity ratio innovations from early 1987 to mid-1988, and
also the negative inﬂuence in late 1989 and throughout 1990,
were highly unusual in historical context. Carrying out the
analytical exercise underlying ﬁgure 3 for earlier periods
(including the Volcker years) indicates no comparable
effects.
IV. Focus on Relative Quantity Movements
and Their Effects
Why did the quantity of commercial paper and bank CDs
grow so rapidly compared to the quantity of Treasury bills
from early 1987 through mid-1989, only to go into reverse
from then on? As ﬁgure 2 shows (see again the bottom
panel), much of the movement of this quantity ratio through-
out 1987–1990 represented historically large ‘‘own’’innova-
tions, not explainable by ﬂuctuations in real output and
prices, or in any of the other ﬁnancial variables under study
here. What happened?
Figure 4 shows that each of the three assets encompassed
in this relationship—commercial paper, bank CDs, and
Treasury bills—exhibited historically unusual movements
FIGURE 3.—CONTRIBUTIONS OF KEY FINANCIAL VARIABLES
TO PAPER–BILL SPREAD
The solid lines show the actual movement of the paper–bill spread, and the dashed lines show the VAR
baseline described in the text. The dotted lines show the effects of adding to the baseline the contribution
of the innovations of each ﬁnancial variable included in the VAR.
FIGURE 4.—VOLUMES OF SELECTED SHORT-TERM DEBT INSTRUMENTS
OUTSTANDING,J ANUARY 1967 TO SEPTEMBER 1996
39 INDICATOR PROPERTIES OF PAPER–BILL SPREADduring this period. Moreover, these respective movements
reinforced one another so as to produce the quantity ratio’s
rapid rise from 1987 through mid-1989 and even more rapid
decline thereafter (see again the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2).
Aggregate net issuance of commercial paper was especially
large during 1988 and the ﬁrst half of 1989, then slowed
until about the end of the recession in early 1991, and then
ceased altogether for the next two years. Net issuance of
bank CDs was likewise strong from 1987 through mid-1989,
but then became negative not just through the recession but
over the next two years as well. These developments
presumably reﬂected some combination of the 1980s’corpo-
rate leverage movement and its aftermath, the weakened
capital positions of many commercial banks, the more
aggressive posture of regulators in classifying nonperform-
ing loans and enforcing capital requirements, and the forced
consolidation (and in many cases liquidation) of the thrift
industry—all of which by now are familiar stories—in
addition, of course, to the inﬂuence of the business cycle
itself.18
By contrast, net issuance of Treasury bills was approxi-
mately zero on average from year-end 1986 through mid-
1989—just when issuance of commercial paper and bank
CDs was so strong—and then became unusually large just as
issuance of paper and CDs turned negative. As table 1
shows, this pattern of bill issuance reﬂected a combination
of U.S. ﬁscal policy, theTreasury’s debt management policy,
and foreign central banks’ exchange rate interventions
(again together with the business cycle). The U.S. Govern-
ment’s budget deﬁcit narrowed from $221 billion in the
1986 ﬁscal year to $150 billion in ﬁscal 1987, and then
remained at about that level for the next two years before
widening to $221 billion in 1990 (and on to $270 billion in
1991). The Treasury chose to maintain approximately its
normal schedule of offerings of notes and bonds throughout
this period, however, and so the quantity of bills outstanding
ﬁrst shrank and then expanded. A typical weekly auction of
bills in 1986 featured $15.0 billion of new 13- and 26-week
bills offered against $14.4 billion of maturing bills. In 1987
the typical auction offered only $13.0 billion of new bills
against $13.5 billion maturing. By ﬁscal 1990 the typical
auction was up to $16.0 billion of new bills against $13.8
billion maturing. Further, just when net bill issuance was
already negative, in 1987, foreign central banks were
intervening heavily in the exchange markets in support of
the dollar, thereby increasing their holdings of U.S.Treasury
bills and correspondingly reducing the market supply.19
The individual movement of each of these three asset
quantities therefore contributed to increasing the ratio of
commercial paper and bank CDs toTreasury bills from 1987
through early 1989, and then to reducing that ratio from
mid-1989 on. To the extent that these observed movements
in the relevant quantities represent independent changes in
asset supplies (that is, changes in the composition of the
‘‘market portfolio’’), while investors consider paper and
CDs to be only imperfect substitutes for bills, standard
portfolio theory predicts that they would affect the market-
clearing expected returns on paper and CDs relative to bills.
Speciﬁcally, from 1987 through early 1989 the larger
relative quantity of paper and CDs would have increased the
paper (and CD) rate relative to the bill rate, while from
mid-1989 on the effect would have been just the opposite.
The vector autoregression described in section III pro-
vides one estimate of the importance of these asset quantity
movements in accounting for the historically atypical move-
ment of the paper–bill spread during this period. The results
shown in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 3 indicate that changing
asset quantities, summarized here in the form of the relevant
ratio, indeed accounted for a major part of the movement of
the paper–bill spread.
Akey question in any such analysis is the extent to which
these asset quantity movements reﬂect independent move-
ment of asset supplies—in this case due to factors like
corporate leveraging and deleveraging, bank capital con-
straints, Treasury debt management, and so on—as opposed
to actions taken by borrowers in response to market forces,
including interest rates themselves. It is therefore important
for this purpose that the orthogonalization of the vector
autoregression underlying ﬁgures 2 and 3 orders the asset
quantity ratio after not only output and prices but also the
level of interest rates (here the federal funds rate). Hence the
innovations plotted in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 2, and the
effects of those innovations on the paper–bill spread shown
in the bottom panel of ﬁgure 3, do represent movements in
the asset quantity ratio due to factors other than either the
business cycle or monetary policy. (As is to be expected, the
relevant impulse response shows that tighter monetary 18 The role of bank capital constraints in restricting bank portfolio
expansion is distinct from the role of monetary policy operating through
the reserves market; see Friedman and Kuttner (1993b).Asmall part of the
decline in CDs outstanding from 1989 on was also probably due to the
development of markets for medium-term notes issued by bank holding
companies and ‘‘bank notes’’issued directly by banks; see Crabbe (1993).
19 Data on the outstanding quantity of bills shown in table 1, used in the
empirical work presented here, do not adjust for the effect of purchases by
foreign central banks.
TABLE 1.—FEDERAL DEFICIT,D EBT STRUCTURE, AND FOREIGN HOLDINGS
OF BILLS, 1984–1990
Year
Federal
Deﬁcit Bills Notes Bonds
Foreign-
Owned
Bills
1984 185.4 374.4 705.1 167.9 122.1
1985 212.3 399.9 812.5 211.1 125.6
1986 221.2 426.7 927.5 249.8 162.4
1987 149.8 389.5 1037.9 282.5 198.3
1988 155.2 414.0 1083.6 308.9 234.7
1989 153.5 430.6 1151.5 348.2 233.0
1990 220.5 527.4 1265.2 388.2 247.5
Notes:Amounts shown are in billions of current dollars. Foreign-owned bills are those held in custody
by the Federal Reserve Banks for foreign official and international accounts, as reported in the Federal
Reserve’s release H4.1. All ﬁgures are for December of the designated year, except those for the federal
deﬁcit, which apply to the October 1–September 30 ﬁscal year.
40 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSpolicy causes the quantity of paper and CDs to increase
relative to bills outstanding.20
Bycontrast,theorderingofvariablesintheorthogonaliza-
tion underlying ﬁgures 2 and 3 implies that corporations’
reliance on commercial paper and banks’issuance of CDs do
not respond, within the month, to ﬂuctuations in the paper
rate (and implicitly the CD rate) relative to the bill rate, and
there is no reason to suppose that this restriction is strictly
true. Fully separating out the truly independent element in
asset supplies, as opposed to supply responses to market
prices set in part by asset demand behavior, would require a
structural supply–demand model specifying the behavior of
borrowers and lenders together with the resulting market-
clearing equilibrium, and such a model lies well beyond the
scope of this paper.21 It is therefore reassuring that variance
decompositions of the same vector autoregression used in
section III, but orthogonalized with the quantity ratio
ordered after the paper–bill spread so that issuance of paper
and CDs can respond to relative interest rates within the
month, also produces asset quantity ratio innovations and
effects of those innovations on the paper–bill spread that are
highly similar to the series shown in ﬁgures 2 and 3,
respectively. In particular, in this alternate set of results the
cumulative contribution to the spread due to quantity ratio
innovations rose from 2 basis points in early 1987 to 21 basis
points at mid-1988, and then declined to 3 basis points by
late 1989 and on to 219 basis points by the beginning of
1991.
These alternate results reinforce the conclusion, from the
bottom panel of ﬁgure 3, that a large part of the historically
unusual movement of the paper–bill spread in the few years
preceding the 1990–1991 recession was indeed attributable
to independent movements of the relevant asset quantities.
V. Have Paper and Bills Become Closer Substitutes?
The focus on relative asset quantities in the analysis
reported in sections III and IV makes sense only if commer-
cial paper and Treasury bills are imperfect substitutes in
investors’portfolios. When two or more assets are imperfect
substitutes, changes in their respective shares in the market
portfolio lead in general to changes in their relative market-
clearing expected returns. By contrast, expected returns on
assets that are perfect substitutes are always identical,
regardless of their respective outstanding quantities. (Even if
the two assets bear differing nonpecuniary returns, their
respective expected pecuniary returns will differ by a
constant spread, or by a spread that changes with variations
in investors’ valuation of the nonpecuniary returns, but in
any case not with changes in their respective quantities.)
In contrast to this paper’s focus on relative asset quantity
movements as a key element in the paper–bill spread’s
failuretoanticipatethe1990–1991recession,someresearch-
ers have suggested that movements in the spread have lost
their predictive power over time as evolution of the U.S.
ﬁnancial markets has rendered commercial paper and Trea-
sury bills if not perfect then at least much closer substi-
tutes.22 As ﬁgure 1 shows, the average spread between the
paper rate and the bill rate has not become systematically
smaller in recent years. Even the fairly narrow average
spread that prevailed after the 1990–1991 recession ended
was not atypical compared to prior nonrecession periods.
Evidence of increasing substitutability between paper and
bills would therefore have to consist of a diminished
relationship between the movements of the spread and the
movements of the corresponding asset quantities.
Oneoftheequationsinthesix-equationvectorautoregres-
sion described in section III—in particular, the equation for
the paper–bill spread—already provides a vehicle for testing
whether the connection between relative asset quantities and
relative interest rates has weakened in recent years. Given
the ordering of variables, which places the paper–bill spread
last, the recursive orthogonalization procedure applied to the
vector autoregression system is equivalent to including in
the spread equation contemporaneous as well as lagged
values of each of the other ﬁve variables, including in
particular the asset quantity ratio. Estimated over the entire
January 1976 through September 1996 sample, the sum of
the coefficients on the quantity ratio terms is 1.58 (with
t-statistic 3.5), implying that a permanent 1% increase in the
quantity of paper and CDs, relative to the broader quantity
also including bills, widens the paper–bill spread by be-
tween 1 and 2 basis points.
Increasing substitutability of paper (and CDs) with bills
would imply a smaller value of this coefficient sum during
the latter part of the sample, but there is no evidence of such
a change. In an augmented version of the same equation,
including additional terms so that each of the contemporane-
ous or lagged quantity ratio terms is also multiplied by a
dummy variable equal to zero before January 1987 and unity
thereafter, the sum of the coefficients on these interaction
terms is actually positive (0.13) and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 10% level (t-statistic 1.64). If anything, therefore, the
evidence points toward slightly diminished substitutability
of paper and CDs for bills in the latter half of the sample.
The results presented in table 2 apply the same test
procedure to three additional forms of the equation for the
paper–bill spread. First, row (1) shows ordinary least-
squares estimates for a somewhat richer speciﬁcation of the
basic reduced-form spread equation, but with a more
parsimonious lag structure. Here the simple asset quantity
ratio is separated into the corresponding contemporaneous
net asset ﬂows, scaled by the lagged total quantity of asset
stocks outstanding, and the lagged asset quantity ratio itself,
and the ﬂow issuance of paper and CDs is distinguished
from the ﬂow issuance of bills. Other variables from the
20 Friedman and Kuttner (1993b), using a more disaggregated system,
found that tigher monetary policy leads to both more paper issuance and
more CD issuance.
21 See Friedman and Roley (1977) for a description and survey of such
models. 22 See again Kashyap et al. (1993) and Thoma and Gray (1994).
41 INDICATOR PROPERTIES OF PAPER–BILL SPREADspread equation in the vector autoregression are included or
excluded according to statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05
level. (The equation also includes an intercept and a linear
time trend, both of which are statistically signiﬁcant; the
trend is small but positive.)The numbers shown in parenthe-
ses are robust t-statistics corrected for heteroskedasticity and
twelfth-order moving-average serial correlation.
The results for the asset quantity variables shown in row
(1) correspond to what standard portfolio theory implies
when assets are imperfect substitutes. An increase in the net
issuance of paper and CDs by 1%, relative to the outstanding
stock of paper, CDs, and bills, widens the paper–bill spread
in the same month by about one-half basis point. A 1%
increase in the net issuance of bills affects the paper–bill
spread by about half as much, in the opposite direction. A
permanent 1% increase in the ratio of paper and CDs to the
broader quantity also including bills widens the spread by
about 3 basis points [1.16/(1 2 0.62)]. The coefficients on
all three terms are signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level or better.
Row (2) shows the results of estimating an expanded
equation in which each of the three asset quantity variables
also appears multiplied by the dummy variable, allowing a
break at January 1987. There is no statistically signiﬁcant
evidence of such a break for either asset ﬂow term, but there
is for the ratio of asset stocks. Here again, however, it is in
the direction indicating a larger effect of relative asset
quantities on relative interest rates, and hence diminished
substitutability of paper and CDs for bills. Here the effect on
the spread due to a permanent 1% change in the quantity
ratio is 2.51 basis points from 1987 on [(0.90 1 0.18)/
(1 2 0.57)], compared to 2.09 basis points in the earlier part
of the sample.
The remaining rows in table 2 present further results that
reﬁne the test for changing substitutability of paper and CDs
for bills, in that they take account of effects of interest rates
on asset supply behavior. Doing so is important because
statements about substitutability among any group of assets
are inherently statements about investors’ asset demand
behavior. To the extent that issuers’ asset supply behavior
also depends on interest rates, and that changing asset
supplies in turn feed back to affect the market-clearing
structure of interest rates, reduced-form equations like those
in the table’s ﬁrst two rows (or the spread equation from the
vector autoregression) will misrepresent the effect on inter-
est rates due to independent asset supply changes, and hence
likewise misrepresent the underlying asset substitutabilities
in investors’portfolios.
The pair of equations shown in rows (3) and (4) take
account of interest rate effects on private asset supplies by
using two-stage least squares with the lagged change in the
federal funds rate as an instrument for the net issuance of
commercial paper and CDs. (The Treasury’s issuance of
bills is again taken to be nonresponsive to interest rates and
therefore not instrumented.) The key identifying assumption
implicit in this structure is that interest rate movements
affect the paper–bill spread only to the extent that they
inﬂuence corporations’issuance of paper or banks’issuance
of CDs. Especially since the equation also includes the
P2–P1 quality differential as a measure of perceived default
risk, the assumption that interest rate levels do not directly
affect investors’ relative demand for paper and CDs versus
bills is not implausible.
The results shown in row (3) are similar to the ordinary
least-squares estimates in row (1), but the effect on the
spread attributed to independent changes in the ﬂow of paper
and CDs is now much larger—as is to be expected once the
simultaneity bias is corrected. Here a 1% increase in the net
issuance of paper and CDs (again relative to the broader
TABLE 2.—TESTS FOR PARAMETER INSTABILITYa
Paper
1 CD
Flow
Bill
Flow
Lagged
Paper
1 CD
Ratio
P2–P1
Differential
Inﬂation
Change
Fed Funds Rate
Lagged
Paper–
Bill
Spread
Paper Rate
Post-1986 Dummy 3
Joint
Signiﬁcance R2 Current Lagged Current Lagged
Bill
Flow
Paper
1 CD
Flow
Paper
1 CD
Ratio
(1) 0.46 20.24 1.16 0.19 20.36 0.13 20.13 0.62 — — — — — — 0.83
(0.12) (0.10) (0.30) (0.07) (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06)
(2) 0.50 20.26 0.90 0.22 20.33 0.13 20.12 0.57 — — 0.04 20.01 0.18 0.08 0.84
(0.14) (0.15) (0.33) (0.08) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.18) (0.18) (0.07)
(3) 2.12 20.20 2.04 0.42 20.31 — — 0.32 — — — — — — 0.70
(0.52) (0.11) (0.54) (0.13) (0.15) (0.14)
(4) 2.33 20.28 1.94 0.59 20.25 — — 0.21 — — 0.14 0.54 0.36 0.02 0.67
(0.53) (0.18) (0.52) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.23) (0.62) (0.13)
(5) 2.62 20.25 2.77 0.63 20.28 — — 0.40 0.07 20.11 — — — — 0.67
(1.57) (0.12) (0.33) (0.34) (0.15) (0.25) (0.06) (0.03)
(6) 1.53 20.37 1.54 0.46 20.25 — — 0.45 0.11 20.11 0.20 0.41 0.20 0.10 0.79
(1.08) (0.14) (0.85) (0.21) (0.12) (0.14) (0.04) (0.03) (0.18) (0.55) (0.12)
Notes: The regressions are estimated on monthly data from January 1975 through September 1996.All regressions also include a constant and linear trend. Both ﬂow variables are annualized and normalized by the
lagged stock of commercial paper 1 CDs 1 Treasury bills. The spread is expressed in percentage terms. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and 12th-order serial correlation.
Equations (3) and (4) are estimated via two-stage least squares, using one lag of the federal funds rate as an instrument for the ﬂow of paper 1 CDs. Equations (5) and (6) are estimated via two-stage least squares, using
the lagged ratio of nonborrowed to lagged total reserves as an instrument for the ﬂow of paper 1 CDs.
a Dependent variable is the 6-month paper–bill spread.
42 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICSasset quantity) widens the paper–bill spread in the same
month by more than 2 basis points, and the permanent effect
of a 1% increase in the ratio of outstanding paper and CDs to
the broader total quantity is 3 basis points. More to the point
of the question at issue in this paper, the evidence again
indicates a change (here signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level) in the
coefficient on the asset quantity ratio in 1987, but again it is
in the direction indicating not greater substitutability of
paper and CDs for bills but less.
Finally, the regressions underlying rows (5) and (6) in
table 2 also include the current and lagged commercial paper
rate to allow for the possibility—due to differential state-
level taxation, for example—that the level of interest rates
might directly affect investors’ demand for paper and CDs
versus bills. Here the instrument for the net issuance of
paper and CDs, in the two-stage estimation, is the lagged
ratio of nonborrowed reserves to total reserves.23 The results
are broadly similar to those shown in the two rows immedi-
ately above, although the signiﬁcance level of several of the
key coefficients differs. (Most obviously, the estimated
coefficient on the instrumented paper-plus-CD ﬂow is larger
here than above, but not statistically signiﬁcant.) Yet again,
the only evidence of a break at 1987—albeit signiﬁcant here
only at the 0.10 level—is for the asset quantity ratio, and yet
again the change is in the direction implying reduced
substitutability.
In short, these results provide no evidence whatever to
support the suggestion that in recent years commercial paper
and Treasury bills have become closer substitutes in inves-
tors’portfolios.
VI. Conclusions and Implications
The empirical work reported in this paper supports two
different (but not mutually exclusive) explanations for the
paper–bill spread’s failure to anticipate the 1990–1991
recession, but does not support two others: First, there is
evidence that the 1990–1991 recession was unusual in not
having been brought about by tight monetary policy. To the
extent that at least part of the spread’s systematic relation-
ship to prior business cycle ﬂuctuations reﬂected its role as
an indicator of monetary policy, there was therefore less
reason to expect the spread to anticipate this particular
recession. Second, there is also evidence that movements of
the spread during the several years prior to the 1990–1991
recessionwereheavilyinﬂuencedbychangesintheoutstand-
ing quantities of commercial paper, bank CDs, and Treasury
bills that occurred for reasons unrelated to the business
cycle.
By contrast, there is no evidence that changing market
perceptions of default risk had much inﬂuence on the
spread’s unusual movements during this period. There is
also no evidence that commercial paper and Treasury bills
have become closer (much less perfect) substitutes in recent
years so that the spread between their respective interest
rates is now mostly ‘‘noise’’ that would not be expected to
exhibit systematic relationships to changes in their respec-
tive quantities (and, via that route, to business cycle ﬂuctu-
ations).
The ﬁnding that asset quantity movements in particular
heavily inﬂuenced the paper–bill spread during the period
under study here highlights the burdens associated with the
use of relative interest rate relationships as business cycle
indicators. Standard portfolio theory shows that, in general,
changes in asset quantitiesshould affect interest rate spreads.
The evidence assembled in this paper shows that, at least in
the case of commercial paper and Treasury bills, changes in
asset quantities do affect interest rate spreads.24 Some
changes in asset quantities occur for reasons related to the
business cycle—after all, that is part of what gives the
spread its indicator properties in the ﬁrst place—while
othersdonot,butchangesofbothkindsaffectthecorrespond-
ing spreads. Naively using any particular interest rate spread
to predict business ﬂuctuations, without being sensitive to
thepossibilityofidiosyncraticmovementsinthecorrespond-
ing asset quantities and hence making due allowance for
those movements when they occur, can therefore be a source
of mistakes. In this respect, at least, interest rate spreads
plainly have much in common with other familiar classes of
business cycle indicators.
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